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Abstract 
This paper proposes design principles for the ‘sustainability syndicate’: shared responsibility among 
diverse stakeholders for sustainability; an agenda for unifying economic and ethical rationales; and 
plural governance based primarily on markets, contracts and collaborative relationships. The paper 
suggests a research agenda directed at issues that constrain sustainability syndicates. Syndication's 
contributions to sustainability build upon its trans-organizational structures for shared responsibility. 
Syndication works as an insurance cooperative that reduces the financial burden of risk. In addition, 
members could rent skill sets from other stakeholders, reduce barriers to entry into bigger projects, 
and improve efficiencies. As underlying sustainability are both economic and ethical rationales for 
shared responsibility, sustainability syndicates induct diverse non-commercial stakeholders into 
inclusive settings. A unifying agenda in these settings, as it grapples with externalities and constructs 
welfare-enhancing solutions, enhances sustainability brand differentiation. Plural self-governance, as 
it corrects for failures of individual self-governance modes, enables market making and market 
access, reduces transaction costs in contracting, and enables members to build the trust and 
commitment necessary for collaborations. Sustainability syndicates obviate the need for command-
and-control interventions. Although institutional, performance and instrumental constraints still 
remain, syndicate business models offer potentially game-changing strategies in sustainability 
marketing. 
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1. Introduction 
Sustainability strategies demand shared responsibility for two strong reasons. One is ethical, as 
outcomes unfold in the commons and affect several stakeholders. The other is economic, as efforts are 
risky and involve substantial financial commitments. The purpose of this paper is to justify and 
contribute a trans-organizational model that links these two reasons. It proposes that syndication, a 
business model for shared economic responsibility, accomplishes this purpose when designed using 
additional principles. Further, the paper identifies current constraints, and proposes a research agenda 
to develop sustainability syndication. 
Unlike generic strategies of product differentiation and cost leadership, sustainability strategies cannot 
be adequately supported by closed business models. Theory informs us that strategies are intimately 
linked to business models. Contingency theories advance the notion that the firm's optimal strategy is 
contingent on its structure. Zott and Amit (2008) review contingencies, and highlight how 
administrative structures determine flexibility in strategic options. They explain the construct of a 
business model as: “… a structural template of how a focal firm transacts with customers, partners, 
and vendors: that is, how it chooses to connect with factor and product markets. It refers to the overall 
gestalt of these possibly interlinked boundary-spanning transactions (p. 3).” This notion affords the 
rationale for enquiry into a contingent trans-organizational model for sustainability strategy's success. 
The present paper contends that syndication, an inherently trans-organizational business model to 
share responsibility, contributes to this endeavor. For scholars the paper addresses the questions: What 
are known theoretical foundations for the sustainability syndicate model? Do research issues remain 
outstanding? For practitioners it addresses: What design principles are salient? What constraints 
inhibit implementation? The extant theory and practice of syndication advances partial answers to 
these questions. 
Syndication is a formal trans-organizational business model to share responsibilities among smaller 
participants in risky environments. Its main contributions to practice have hitherto been in multiple 
stakeholder structures for risk reduction, standards setting, and business development. This paper 
proposes expanding the scope of syndication so that diverse stakeholders may better address their 
mutual sustainability externalities: denial of rights to resources, underinvestment in public goods, 
barriers to entry, the slow pace of innovation, high sustainability risks and uncertainties, or distributed 
capabilities and information. The main contribution of the paper for practitioners is a set of design 
principles to evolve the Sustainability Syndicate. Drawing upon recent theoretical literature, it also 
contributes a scholarly research agenda for sustainability syndication. 
The clothing industry provides examples of trans-organizational business models that facilitate 
sustainability strategies. A complex global chain shapes the industry (Eurosif, 2012). Smaller 
enterprises account for over 80% of the market (Defra, 2011). Water pollution in textile hubs in Asia 
begets significant health, agriculture, livestock and drinking water losses (Govindrajulu, 2003). State 
pollution control boards (PCBs) monitor non-compliance with discharge standards and take 
disciplinary action, through disconnection of water and electricity supply or, in extreme cases, 
through recourse to court orders. Different PCBs for hubs located in China, India and SE Asia apply 
differing standards for treated water quality. Courts in southern India have found dyers to be liable in 
a major local textile hub, and ordered shut downs of all common effluent treatment plants (CETPs) 
not meeting stringent zero liquid discharge standards. As a result, hubs with less stringent standards, 
such as those based on biological oxygen demand, enjoy a cost advantage. Dyeing processes migrate 
to these hubs and create hot spots of pollution. Sustainability challenges for stakeholders here are 
community water security, discharge from hub units, economies of scale in treatment facilities, 
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uneven standards across hubs, and uncertain costs of cleaner dyeing technology. A superior strategy is 
where textile brands and community organizations jointly participate in developing solutions for 
targeted standards that evolve over a planned trajectory. This strategy requires a contingent trans-
organizational business model with shared responsibilities on resource use, innovation and 
certification. Syndication, which is such a model, would allow more flexible agreements and lesser 
recourse to PCB or court enforcement. For instance, under the Delhi CETP Act 2000, dyers and 
textile manufacturers in an industrial estate must entrust CETP management to a society of users. This 
model involves multiple stakeholders in sharing responsibility for reduction of discharge and for clean 
technology innovation. 
Material pooling of ecologically intelligent fabrics illustrates syndication. Braungart (2002) describes 
how several innovative textile mills form a “polyester coalition” with a trans-organizational business 
model. A strategy contingent on this model is to pool purchasing power among manufacturers to favor 
sustainable materials that are recycled or reused. The coalition involves customers for innovation in 
materials. This is a well-designed syndication business model in that it allocates responsibility on 
materials and operations among diverse stakeholders, delivers profitability with lowered ecological 
footprints, and mixes markets, contracts and collaborative relationships for self-governance. 
The rest of the paper advances principles for the design of such trans-organizational models. We 
begin in the next section with the key design motive: shared responsibility for sustainability. The 
following section describes syndication as a trans-organizational business model for shared 
responsibility; outlines key ideas of syndicate theory; and describes previously examined economic 
rationales for syndication. The next two sections advance additional design principles when ethical 
rationales for shared responsibility are added to the economy: a value based agenda that unifies the 
two, and plural self-governance that binds together diverse sustainability interests. The penultimate 
section weighs constraints that have limited the formation of sustainability syndicates, and advocates 
directions for conceptual development. A final section concludes with the benefits of syndication. 
 
2. Sustainability and multi-stakeholder shared responsibility 
Almost three decades ago the Brundtland Commission, formally World Commission on Environment 
and Development, defined sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Most 
definitions now pre-suppose widespread participation in sustainability. Declarations, published by 
organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme, World Wildlife Fund, and 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, repeatedly list global cooperation and inter-country 
collaboration as core requirements for sustainability. 
All definitions appreciate that development will probably cause damage, and lead to conflicts centered 
on resource utilization decisions. Received principles for preventing damages or resolving conflicts 
hold a particular stakeholder liable, or assign responsibility to a single organization. The list below is 
a concise re-statement of these alternative principles. 
i. The stakeholder held responsible is the one that can provide the least cost solution. This is derived 
from Coase (1960) and is the “least cost” principle. 
ii. The stakeholder that has greatest authority in the extended organization is held responsible. This is 
derived from Arrow (1974) and is a “central authority” principle. 
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iii. The stakeholder that originates the damage is held responsible for its abatement. This is the 
familiar “polluter pays” principle (OECD, 1975). 
iv. The stakeholder that finds a new business opportunity in sustainability should provide solutions. 
This is a version of “Porter's hypothesis” (Porter, 1991). 
There is, however, another alternative. Young (2004) advances the philosophical premise of shared 
responsibility in the context of labor justice, and submits that it applies more generally. Shared 
responsibility is necessary “…both because the injustices that call for redress are the product of the 
mediated actions of many, and thus because they can only be rectified through collective action. For 
most such injustices, the goal is to change structural processes by reforming institutions or creating 
new ones that will better regulate the process to prevent harmful outcomes.” (p. 387). The harmful 
outcomes prevented by virtue of sustainability enjoin an ethical rationale for shared responsibility. 
In practice, multiple stakeholders share responsibility for supplanting key structural processes for 
sustainability (see Gibson, Hassan, Holtz, Tansy, & Whitelaw, 2005 for a review of processes). 
Processes minimally solicit community participation to share knowledge. Many go further with 
demands for community control of protective social structures and civil society oversight. All 
processes include strengthening the ability to participate in a creative, self-directed manner. 
Assessment requires municipal councils to inform multi-sector stakeholder groups and communities 
adequately in advance; consult and deliberate with them; hold public hearings of draft regional growth 
plans; consolidate and share findings; and negotiate with related stakeholders or government agencies. 
Stakeholders in Stewardship Councils specifically include environmental and social organizations, 
sector bodies and corporations, community groups, indigenous peoples' organizations, certification, 
legislative and adjudication bodies. Shared responsibility is evident in the practice of carbon 
disclosure by corporations to help assess the industrial sector's plans to curb emissions, necessary for 
public agencies to determine caps and allocations of discharge permits. 
A scholarly perspective on rationales for shared responsibility derives from stakeholder theory. 
Scholars of organizational design have developed stakeholder theory over three decades (for instance, 
Bhattacharya et al., 2009, Clarkson, 1995, Donaldson and Preston, 1995, Freeman, 1984, Jones and 
Wicks, 1999, Margolis and Walsh, 2003, Mitchell et al., 1997, Sheth et al., 2011, Smith et al., 2010 
and Vandenbergh and Cohen, 2010). The theory explains how organizations balance the economic 
and non-economic ends of diverse stakeholders, and argues against organizational behavior being 
inevitably motivated by nothing more than narrow self-interest (Brickson, 2007, Jones and Wicks, 
1999 and O'Higgins, 2010). One of its branches, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory, proposes that 
organizations achieve non-economic outcomes that stakeholders desire if they engage in certain 
instrumental behaviors (for example, Jones & Wicks, 1999). Stakeholders in business, civil society 
and government – with diverse organizational identities, different responsiveness to incentives, and 
differing capabilities, preferences and beliefs – share responsibility for these behaviors. 
Yet corporations also fail to shoulder responsibility. O'Higgins (2010) reviews discretionary 
approaches to corporate social responsibility and furnishes evidence of frequent inadequacies in 
practice. An implication is that firms lack the capability to design trans-organizational models that 
share responsibilities. A single stakeholder operating with a closed organizational model is bound to 
shirk full responsibility or liability. Trans-organizational models are necessary to devolve more 
optimal, realistic and fair allocations of responsibility among these stakeholders. Both contingency 
theory and instrumental stakeholder theory support this implication. We therefore forward the 
following principle for design of sustainability syndicates. 
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Proposition 1. A diverse set of stakeholders shares responsibility for successful sustainability strategy. 
Diversity is a strategic strength in the sharing of responsibilities. Yet it is rarely that diverse 
stakeholders have trans-organizational structures available. We next examine how a syndication 
model fills this gap between strategy and structure. 
 
3. Shared responsibility in syndication 
This section traces the origins of the economic theory of syndication, reviews syndication theory and 
practice in financial and corporate management, and proposes the design principles for a sustainability 
syndicate. The original meaning of syndication is a coming together for financial gain. An early 
mention of syndication is in a Harvard Business Review article on the legal role of a financial 
syndicate manager (HBR, 1929). The theory of syndicates has foundations in group decision making 
(Amershi and Stoeckenius, 1983, Arrow, 1974, Holmstrom, 1982, Pratt, 2000 and Wilson, 1968). Its 
elements include group utilities, joint probability assessments, evaluation measures, risk pooling and 
sharing rules. Management science models using these elements have analyzed the benefits of 
syndication for many applications: trans-organizational design, financial instruments, banking, 
insurance, and betting. The theoretical development in Wilson (1968) provides an operational 
definition of a syndicate as a “group of individual decision makers who must make a common 
decision under uncertainty, and who, as a result, will receive jointly a payoff to be shared among 
them.” (p. 119). 
A major economic motivation for syndicates is risk sharing among team members. Pratt (2000) 
reviews models of risk sharing in syndicates and generalizes many analytical results. Syndication for 
risk sharing is seen in bond issues, insurance cooperatives, oil exploration and underwriting. Pichler 
and Wilhelm (2001) research stability in syndicate membership, creation of entry barriers, and 
qualification of lead players. Often a lead bank is proactive in forming the syndicate – which could 
comprise a few to several dozen banks – to underwrite initial public offerings by a target issuer. 
Financial syndication mechanisms can (a) identify the lead member to authorize as issuer; (b) select 
member banks; (c) prescribe an economic agenda with shared responsibility among members; (d) 
negotiate sharing agreements for joint payoffs; (e) limit under-performance and legal risks; (f) 
diversify deals to reduce unsystematic risk of the portfolio; and (g) diminish uncertainty by increasing 
future deal opportunities. Research has led to several crucial conclusions: the issuer should generally 
use negotiation mechanisms rather than competitive bidding to select syndicate members (Hansen & 
Khanna, 1994); greater legal risk encourages increased membership in financial syndicates (Esty & 
Megginson, 2003); deal flows are more prevalent than portfolios as motives for syndication (Manigart 
et al., 2006). 
Models of corporate syndication demand settings to support longer term collaborative relationships. In 
their organization theory, Sorenson and Stuart (2008) advance the doctrine that settings are essential 
for syndication. Settings include research consortia, trade associations, investment syndicates, 
standards bodies, business groups, and boards of directors. Blair, Williams, and Lin (2008) argue that 
a fourth enforcement mechanism for coordinating outcomes – in addition to organization within the 
firm, organization through contract, and reputation enforcement mechanisms – is third-party non-
governmental standards setting. Corporate syndication mechanisms create settings that (a) influence 
common business agendas; (b) enhance trust and collaborative relationships; (c) attract organizational 
leadership; and (d) evolve with greater participation from dyads to networks. Graebner and Eisenhardt 
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(2004) contrast corporate syndication with contractual governance of the principal-agent kind. 
Syndicate members resemble partners, distinct from agents with high conflict potential or from 
stewards with no conflict potential. Consensus emerges through negotiated compromise, and not 
through alignment of interests. Syndicates coordinate decisions through formal network contracting, 
and not through ownership transfers or agency hierarchies. In sum, the above cited literature reveals 
major economic benefits originating from trans-organizational syndication structures for shared 
responsibility among commercial organizations. 
Syndication's economic potential for sustainability is evident in permits trading. Commercial 
stakeholders in the economic and ecological system share responsibilities for generating emission 
reductions over product lifecycles. These stakeholders enter into common decisions to generate, 
contribute, aggregate, and monetize certificates of emission reduction (CERs). CERs are a form of 
tradable property rights policy makers assign to innovative organizations that reduce emissions. The 
syndicate earns revenues from CER trades in permits markets, and devises a sharing rule that allocates 
portions of joint CER sales revenues to members. 
A Sustainability Syndicate, therefore, is a trans-organizational model that allocates responsibilities 
among members for improved sustainability. As ethical responsibility is of equal importance in 
sustainability, additional design principles are necessary to expand the scope of syndication beyond 
economic structures. Principles to accomplish this unify economic and ethical rationales, and bind 
diverse stakeholder interests together with a mix of self-governance modes. The sustainability 
syndicate deals with “… the structure, content, and governance of transactions” (Amit & Zott, 2001: 
p. 511) as do all business models, but shifts emphasis from the “focal firm and its exchange partners” 
(Amit & Zott, 2001) to trans-organizational structures directed at sustainability strategy. We therefore 
advance the definitional proposition. 
Proposition 2. A Sustainability Syndicate is a trans-organizational model that stakeholders design with 
the principles of shared responsibility among diverse syndicated members, a unifying sustainability 
agenda, and plural governance. 
The principles of a unifying agenda and plural governance add normative design considerations to 
business syndication, as they combine ethical with economic responsibilities. The next sections 
discuss these design principles. 
 
4. A unifying agenda 
In a prescient book, Arrow (1974) observes that a ‘coercive fact’ or crisis “may be more persuasive 
than any speculation about potential benefits from change” in forcing new items onto the agenda of 
organizations (p. 52). Today the coercive fact of ecological disaster in the imminent future is hard to 
deny, forcing shared responsibility for sustainability onto the agenda. 
Syndicate agendas that unify ethical and economic rationales result in improved sustainability derived 
from new allocations of responsibility. For instance, syndicated market trades in commodity CERs 
serve the economic rationale for shared responsibility, as noted above, when syndicate membership is 
restricted to commercial organizations. Membership diversifies with shared responsibility as noted in 
Proposition 1, to include communities, civil society and consumers. Therefore, sustainability 
syndicates apply additional ethical criteria, such as community welfare or reduced health risks, to 
jointly produced CERs. Diverse syndicate members share responsibility for raising ethical standards 
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for their joint CERs in a way the single organization cannot. Sustainability syndicates thereby evolve 
a unifying internal agenda for differentiated CERs. One benefit is to forestall leakage, as syndicate 
CERs encompass emission reduction from widely dispersed members across potential pollution 
havens. Diverse interests of local stakeholders guide ambient standards. In support of differentiated 
CERs, Hamilton and Requate (2012) observe “… efficiency gains exist in developing combined 
environmental policies that take into account the interaction between ambient standards and emissions 
standards” in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (p. 9). 
A sustainability syndicate's unifying agenda is instrumental in long term financial success for all 
members. Early findings qualified claims for financial benefits for commercial corporations from 
socially responsible investing (King & Lenox, 2001). But later studies report clear evidence of 
superior financial performance, in particular from eco-efficiency and corporate sustainability 
performance (Aggarwal and Dow, 2010, Derwall et al., 2005 and Epstein, 2008). Corporate 
sustainability settings yield demonstrable value. Potowski and Prakash (2005) assert the value of 
goodwill for firms gaining admittance into “green clubs” such as 14001. Sustainability branding 
delivers significant economic value for the individual commercial organization: more than a third of 
the largest hundred companies in the OECD countries' voluntary report on sustainability; even smaller 
firms adopt certification standards such as the ISO 14000 (for other sustainability reporting 
frameworks, see also Elkington, 1998 and Nikolaeva and Bicho, 2011). Ethical rationales for shared 
responsibility provide further opportunities to differentiate. By mitigating damages that are visible and 
accessible to its diverse members but invisible or inaccessible to the individual commercial 
organization, the syndicate inimitably sets itself apart. Sustainability foot-printing today assesses the 
entire lifecycle of products and services (Rothenberg, 2007). Syndicates insure themselves against 
public relations debacles as all members adopt sustainability credos, collaborate across tiers of the 
value chain, and engage in biodiversity preservation and conservation efforts. We therefore advance 
the proposition. 
Proposition 3. An agenda that unifies ethical and economic rationales for shared responsibility 
achieves superior sustainability value through differentiation. 
A unifying agenda among multiple stakeholders is rife with stresses that at best disrupt coordinated 
activity and at worst threaten trans-organizational survival. Heterogeneous governance modes offer 
mechanisms designed to pre-empt or resolve conflict, but each has its limitations. 
 
5. Governance modes 
Principles to assign liability listed in Section 2 expect public agencies and courts to issue mandates 
and procure compliance via “command-and-control.” Self-governance, on the other hand, supports 
shared responsibility with incentives. Basic self-governance modes are market transactions, contracts 
and collaborative relationships. There is evidence that self-governance is superior to command-and-
control, as the latter leads to over control and is more expensive to implement (Tao, Yang, & Zhou, 
2000). This is because: (i) command-and-control requires passage of specific acts in state parliaments; 
(ii) self-governance sets collaborative, flexible and evolutionary targets that command-and-control 
cannot; (iii) it entails high monitoring costs and needs information on cost-of-abatement; and (iv) 
increased democratization and participation in sustainable development ensue from self-governance 
(Stavins, 1995). Despite their advantages over command-and-control, self-governance modes display 
deficiencies. 
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5.1. Market failures 
Market failures routinely explored in the economics literature are due to uncertainties and information 
asymmetry problems (for instance, see Akerlof, 1970 for a classic illustration). Sachs (2008) discusses 
four macro-reasons why markets fail in delivering sustainable economic activity: profitability is 
inadequate for investment in research and development; adoption and diffusion of innovation is too 
slow; larger forces such as demographic trends result in market distortions; and infrastructure is 
absent for market access. 
In addition, market failures stem from externalities. Externalities are defined as by-products of 
exchange, with costs and benefits that open markets do not formally include in the pricing system. 
They have significant economic roles and impacts, and yet externalities are not commodities that 
organizations can trade on open markets in any meaningful manner. Significant market failures are 
due to society's inability to fully account for costs or enforce collection of due revenues for 
externalities. Some externalities are favorable and positive – such as trust, loyalty, ethical values and 
some network effects. However, many are negative – such as ambient pollutants, GHG emissions, 
stakeholder marginalization and deforestation (for several classic examples see Arrow, 1974, Coase, 
1960, Sachs, 2008 and Stern Review Report, 2007). Negative externalities are the collateral problems 
of closed business models where shareholders exclude other stakeholders. A narrow self-interest 
drives strategies contingent on such models, but that very self-interest is the source of collective 
disasters. Negative externalities are then borne by stakeholders invisible to such closed organizational 
models. The literature recognizes that the sole use of market mechanisms can neither curtail 
consumption of natural resources, nor encourage technological capacity to meet present and future 
needs (for instance, Salzman, 1997). The following proposition summarizes. 
Proposition 4. Information and externality problems limit ability to self-govern shared responsibility 
with the market mode. 
 
5.2. Contractual incompleteness 
Incompleteness in contracting arises due to failures to (a) anticipate contingencies and situations; (b) 
devise joint courses of action; (c) write explicit clauses for contingencies; or (d) monitor and enforce 
agreements (Hart & Holmstrom, 1987). These contractual failures are extremely costly to fix. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) takes a descriptive approach to implications of incomplete 
contracting (Williamson, 1986). Arrow (1974) argues that contractual approaches can only partially 
solve information problems, and organization relationships will be necessary. Seshadri and Mishra 
(2004) argue that contractual agreements on simpler exchanges support more complex relations 
between the same parties. In recent work, Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier (2012) find evidence that 
governance of franchise systems improves when contractual incentives interact with extra-contractual 
incentives. These interactions subjugate short term self-interest to long term joint interests (Feinman, 
2000 and Macneil, 2000). We therefore advance the proposition. 
Proposition 5. Incompleteness limits ability to self-govern shared responsibility with the contractual 
mode. 
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5.3. Relationship termination 
Collaborating partners cannot assure continuity in relationships. Wilson (1995) shows that 
continuation or termination of well-established relationships is contingent on several factors. 
Relationships are of finite duration; continuity is an ideal. High expectation of future exchange is 
unrealistic (Crosby, Evans, & Cowles, 1990). Terminations of relationships adversely affect other 
stakeholders besides the terminated business entity. Even the possibility of termination forces 
restrictions on relationships that lead to hoarding of information that parties acquire during the course 
of their exchange, and thwarting verifiability of claims that may accompany termination. TCE 
formally recognizes that these restrictions are costly to overcome (Williamson, 1986). Firms terminate 
their relationships if they perceive costs of relationship continuity to outweigh rewards (Dwyer, 
Schurr, & Oh, 1987). These considerations lead to the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. Restrictions from termination limit ability to self-govern shared responsibility with the 
relationship mode. 
 
5.4. Plural governance 
Multi-stakeholder organizations can and must exploit complementarities of self-governance modes for 
shared responsibilities. Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach (2000) argue that plural forms of governance 
safeguard inter-firm exchanges. They recommend managers mix these modes for complex governance 
structures and not treat them as mutually exclusive alternatives. Wang, Bradford, Xuc, and Weitz 
(2008) show a favorable impact of ‘trust with contracts’ in mixed-mode governance structures 
(consistent with Kashyap et al., 2012). Contracts provide recourse to limit the risk stakeholders face 
from violations of trust. Parties improve on their market performance when they write future-looking 
terms into the contract. Relationship complexity and continuity improves with the insurance offered 
by fall-backs to simpler agreements. Co-management, a mix of market-based, bureaucracy-based and 
community-based self-governance, illustrates plural governance of shared responsibility. Among 
Commercial Stakeholder Organizations in the marine products industry co-management has proved its 
worth (Stephens, 2006 and Yandle, 2003). In sum, plural self-governance obviates the use of 
command-and-control; which then only provides deterrence value as a credible punishment strategy. 
We therefore forward the following proposition. 
Proposition 7. Market failures, contractual incompleteness and termination of relationships make it 
necessary that sustainability syndicates support shared responsibility with plural governance. 
The previous sections have outlined design of a special kind of syndicate, the sustainability syndicate, 
as a contingent trans-organizational model for sustainability strategy. A sustainability syndicate 
unifies ethical and economic reasons to share responsibility, and mixes mutually supporting self-
governance modes. We next identify opportunities for conceptual development of sustainability 
syndication, and point to further research directions. 
 
6. A research agenda for sustainability syndicates 
Our proposed research agenda takes on key constraints that discourage the formation of sustainability 
syndicates. First, an institutional constraint obstructs managers from fiduciary duties toward shared 
responsibility. Second, a performance constraint frustrates evaluation of the sustainability agenda. 
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Last, the instrument constraint distorts the mix of incentives from self-governance modes. For each 
we catalog promising research questions for syndication that arise from recent theory and path-
breaking practice. 
The institutional constraint obligates managers to resist changes in fiduciary duties that accompany 
shared responsibility. Under usual forms of incorporation, managers owe a direct fiduciary duty to 
shareholders to maximize their own organization's wealth. Sustainability syndicates re-orient 
managers to joint stakeholder gains which are indirect pathways to shareholder wealth, partially 
controlled by other organizations. What fiduciary dissonance will arise between direct organizational 
and indirect syndicate routes to shareholder wealth? Similar dissonance accompanies managerial 
choices between long term versus short term strategies. Policies related to company practice, tax 
regimes and regulatory environments change the balance in these choices. What corresponding 
policies serve to re-orient fiduciary duties in favor of syndication? Benefit Corporations are a class of 
corporations that replace fiduciary duty to shareholders with an obligation to create a material positive 
impact on society. Their mission is to uphold a new standard of conduct that does not increase 
liability to non-shareholders. B-Corps claim that stakeholder network effects lead to financial 
advantages, justifying this mission even for their closed business models. How may sustainability 
syndicates adapt the B-Corp manager's responsibilities to fiduciary duty for a trans-organizational 
model? 
Research in recent years has built a rationale for trans-organizational models with new fiduciary 
duties for managers. Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) argue that whole industries are experimenting 
with open models. Does sustainability syndication favor some industries and not others? Ehret and 
Wirtz (2011) link several theories of business strategy to explain how specialization leads to opening 
of business models. Are more successful syndicates in industries that exhibit greater specialization, 
composed of more specialized members? Leading management theorists have recently recast durable 
frameworks of competitive advantage as collaborative shared value across profit/non-profit 
boundaries (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Kotler (2011) designates diverse stakeholder roles in the 
“environmental imperative.” Hult (2011) interrogates marketing and organization scholarship to 
address the boundary-spanning role of marketing. What corresponding changes manifest in syndicate 
managerial functions? Do managers advance their careers when they collaborate with not-for-profit 
organizations? Day (2011) points to a growing gap between any individual organization's capabilities 
and its own market imperatives, and proposes “open” marketing with jointly adaptive efforts 
dispersed across partner networks to close the gap. Do syndicates provide a superior formal structure 
for joint adaptation? These converging streams of research provide direction to future investigation of 
syndication's contribution to opening business models, and in redefining fiduciary duties for shared 
responsibility. 
The performance constraint leads stakeholders to disagree on evaluations of a unified agenda for 
sustainability. Absence of universally accepted performance measures confuses strategy. Even for 
closed business models, measures that unify ethical and economic performance are very complex and 
inaccessible to practitioners (Hubbard, 2009). Epstein (2008: 169–177) provides a detailed list of 
performance measures in sustainability, some of which scholars have integrated into marketing 
performance (for example, Sharma, Gopalkrishnan, Mehrotra, & Krishnan, 2010). Specific extensions 
of these measurements to trans-organizational performance are a research priority. What measures of 
the syndicate's unified agenda are acceptable to all stakeholders? Does unifying ethical and economic 
performance demand other measurement frameworks? Epstein and Widener (2011) offer one such 
framework that incorporates stakeholder reactions. 
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The resource-based view (RBV) applied to syndicates offers directions for scholarly research on 
syndicate performance. RBV of the firm, a major paradigm in strategy research, has made the case to 
measure and relate performance to resources at both the organizational (Barney, 1991 and Wernerfelt, 
1984) and the sub-organizational level of functional performance (Cho and Pucik, 2005 and Ray et 
al., 2004). In contrast, a RBV of the syndicate requires stakeholders to measure trans-organizational 
performance and external resources – factors or inputs necessary to the organization's performance but 
not subject to its direct control – where research has been sparse. Which stakeholder resources have 
stronger effects on performance with a unified agenda? Do stakeholder internal resources have 
synergies with a syndicate's external resources? How do pooled resources interact with internal and 
external stakeholder resources? Hult, Ketchen, and Arrfelt (2007) researches a culture of 
competitiveness and knowledge development in supply chains, both trans-organizational resources, 
from RBV perspectives. Latent measures and causal models to evaluate a unified agenda are 
challenges for research. 
The instrument constraint demands that stakeholders subject self-governance instruments to plural 
incentive-compatibility requirements. Incentive-compatible requirements ensure that the member's 
expected payoff from rational behavior in the syndicate exceeds its expectations from non-
participation. Self-governance modes use instruments such as sharing contracts or reverse auctions to 
satisfy incentive-compatibility. When these modes are used exclusively these instruments are well 
understood; but research is sparse for their mixed use in plural governance. Plural incentive-
compatibility for instruments gains complexity for diverse stakeholders in permit trading systems 
(Hung & Shaw, 2005). How do contractual instruments within syndicates interact with forward 
pricing market instruments? For instance, how do sharing rules for the member's portion of joint 
revenue in syndicates interact with pricing mechanisms for tradable property rights? Diverse 
syndicate members must reach consensus on what constitutes their fair share of economic gain from 
trades in exchange for property rights that safeguard their welfare. As self-governance is an 
alternative to command-and-control, it is critically important that this consensus remain independent 
of court directives. How do syndicates monetize contributions and allocate shares with non-
commercial member organizations? Research on instruments and mechanisms has largely been 
confined to economic motivations, overlooking incentives for collaboration among non-business 
stakeholders on a unifying agenda. 
New instruments to differentiate emission reduction efforts by diverse stakeholders are viable as 
information on actual damage becomes more accurate and delivery of social welfare more urgent. 
Differentiated CERs unify ethical considerations, such as reducing health risks, with the economic 
criterion of tradable property rights. Permit price then reflects sustainability quality. Muller and 
Mendelsohn (2009) observe that differentiating permits is equivalent to “trading stocks of companies 
on the basis of their share price, not the number of shares (p. 1735).” Welfare consequences of 
efficiency policies based on quality differentiated permits, mentioned also in Section 4 above, can 
surpass those of quantity policies based on commoditized permits (Muller and Mendelsohn, 2009; 
Fowlie & Muller, 2012). What sustainability quality measures suit syndicate use for vertical 
differentiation – or ‘increase’ in quality? And what suit horizontal differentiation – or ‘taste’ in 
quality? The literature on vertical and horizontal quality differentiation is a foundation for future 
research on sustainability quality differentiated permits as tradable property rights. 
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6.1. Limitations of sustainability syndicates 
Some conditions make sustainability syndication unattractive. Firstly, sustainability is not always a 
constituent generic strategy for competitive advantage. Instead firms adopt other value propositions 
for cost leadership or product differentiation. For instance, in fashion clothing, less than 15% of the 
UK market share is held by sustainability positioned brands (Saicheua, Knox, & Cooper, 2012). 
However, the competitiveness of a sustainability strategy improves with evolving policy frameworks 
and consumer tastes (Lash and Wellington, 2007 and Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Secondly, 
some unavoidable conflicts from divergent goals remain unresolved even with plural self-governance. 
Failures to reach agreement invite command-and-control outcomes enforced by courts. To avoid this, 
an evolving legal framework for sustainability envisages roles for covenant negotiators and 
ombudspersons. Castro (2012) observes that the reception of new laws rely on psychosocial aspects 
such as “… communication between mediating systems and their publics. This can reveal the power 
positions of the groups involved in contesting or applauding the laws, how these may be linked to 
issues of perceived legitimacy… (p. 111).” Just as with legal innovations, syndicates should plan on 
project specific mediating systems. Finally, communication problems impose limitations. Sensitive 
information such as know-how is often only partially shared. Credible communication is a hurdle, as 
lifecycle emission reduction claims from dispersed stakeholders are costly to verify. Outcomes that 
differentiate tradable property rights on ethical criteria are imperfectly known, and are a source of 
information rents. These contingency, conflict, and communication limitations will be less deterring, 
however, as stakeholders prioritize sustainability. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The design principles for a sustainability syndicate, developed in this paper, were motivated by the 
recognition that sustainability strategies are inherently trans-organizational and therefore contingent 
on trans-organizational business models. The pivotal principle is one of shared responsibility. An 
established business model for shared business responsibility is syndication. Rules of syndication 
cover structure of membership, setting of common goals and objectives, and sharing of joint rewards 
between stakeholders. The additional challenges that sustainability brings to syndication stem from 
unifying ethical and economic responsibilities among diverse stakeholders. The paper's main 
contributions to practice are the set of principles for sustainability syndicate design: shared 
responsibility, a unifying agenda, and plural governance. The paper advances several research 
questions to help overcome constraints stakeholders face in building sustainability syndicates. 
Benefits of membership make well-designed sustainability syndicates very attractive. Shared 
responsibility among diverse stakeholders enables members to expand the scope of sustainability 
solutions. Syndication works as an insurance cooperative for members, and reduces the financial 
burden of risk. In addition, members could rent skill sets from other stakeholders, reduce barriers to 
entry into bigger projects, and improve efficiencies. Syndication with shared responsibility also helps 
avoid free riding, and monetizes otherwise prohibitive investments in public goods. A unifying 
agenda enables members to grapple with externalities, harmonize their goals, and construct 
comprehensive welfare-enhancing solutions. Plural governance has several advantages: it corrects for 
failures of individual governance modes, enables market making and market access, reduces 
transaction costs in contracting, enables members to build the trust and commitment necessary for 
collaborations, and obviates command-and-control interventions. 
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The capability of individual organizations to devise and execute sustainability strategies for the 
common good without syndication is severely constrained. As pressures mount for sustainable 
growth, governments are apt to assign property rights where commons are involved to well-structured 
syndicates, rather than to individual stakeholders. Membership in a sustainability syndicate could be 
indispensable in the imminent future. 
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